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RE: REFLECTOR: EFIS
Doug,
You pretty much hit the nail on the head with the problems related to
designing a system that allows you to survive a failure. My approach is to
provide a primary "glass" system that gives me all of the information I
need for normal operations and provide the old-fashioned cluster (electric
miniatures) for the emergency and cross checking in an out-of-the-way
location on the panel. Rather than going with something like the Sierra
dual redundant configuration which is prone to two failures of the same
kind.
Sidebar on failures:
I've worked in software engineering for over 20 years, with more than 5
of that
doing GPS systems and commercial avionics. There have been many times
when I've seen redundant systems, e.g., the high-end configurations of
Archangel
or Sierra packages, crash on both sides because an input anomaly causes
the
same software failure twice. This is why NASA prefers for their mission
critical
systems (and the Navy mandates for its nuclear control systems) that two
different
software houses develop the code on important redundant installations.
As for the attitude indicator failure in IMC, I too have been there,
done that. It
was a dramatic event, the gyro tumbled violently (and, as near as I can
tell I
survived). For the record, the problem with vacuum driven instruments
is not the
gyros; rather it is the vacuum pumps. I have also seen the insidious
method of
pump failure; it happens so slowly that a busy or inattentive IFR pilot
could easily fly
into an unrecoverable unusual attitude by following it. (John Deacon
published an
excellent article on this very subject a few years back on AVWEB).
In any event, I got the same impression in my discussions with the
Archangel people when talking about the capabilities of the product and how
to design it into my system. Unless you call up and tell them you are from
Cessna, they seem to be reluctant to provide the appropriate engineering
and technical information (like your $30,000 doesn't rate that kind of
consideration).
As Brian Michalk will discover (and he probably has already) the whole
glass cockpit concept is about its software. The Archangel folks puff
themselves up like its something special to have an FAA TSO for their box.
The FAA, as an organization, is totally clueless when it comes to this
kind of "black magic" (yes, I've also seen first hand one of the commercial
vendors I've work with bullshit the FAA into issuing their box a TSO). It
seems they should be LOWERING the price by $15K on a TSO'd box instead of
raising it.
Anyway, the point of all this dribble is that I think it's a bad idea to
expect the Archangels or Sierras to provide redundancy (without a full
disclosure of what is in their system). And it is naive or even stupid to
expect that the FAA TSO certification means anything. So we mix & match
the promising new with the tried-&-true.
Regards,
Joe Stack
983SC/XLRG